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India has been implementing Microfinance programmes for the last three decades. The journey from 
Micro-Credit to Microfinance has been long. Presently formal financial institutions and government 
and non-government agencies are implementing microfinance programmes all over the country. 
However, it is found that there is no synergy among these organisations. They are not sharing 
information about their clientele among themselves. This paper makes an attempt to analyse the impact 
of an increase in competition among microfinance institutions on the decision of delaying the 
repayment by their clients.   
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I. Introduction 
Government of India has taken various steps for alleviating poverty since Independence. 
However, in spite of the various efforts, almost 27 percent1 of total population in India still 
continues to be below the poverty line. It is identified that most of the poor are in the rural areas. 
Further, along with this poverty scenario, no adequate employment has been generated in the 
labour market in India. This may be one of the reasons for the persistence of poverty. Poor 
adopt various coping strategies to surmount their poverty situation. Credit, Asset Selling and 
Migration are some of the popular coping strategies adopted by the poor in India. Development 
Economists have over the years proposed that credit is one of the best strategies to overcome the 
problem of poverty. Credit can help the poor in taking up income generation activities which will 
in turn improve their standard of living. 
Theory of Rural Credit Market says that the formal financial institutions do not have the perfect 
information about the poor borrowers. So lending to a poor is risky as the person is not able to 
offer enough asset as collateral to the lender (Ray, 1998). Apart from this, the borrower has 
limited liability. If the project fails, the borrower is not able to repay the loan.  These factors limit 
the access of the poor to credit in the formal rural credit market. In this context, Stiglitz (1990) 
explains three problems of formal financial sector: Screening problem2, Incentive Problem3 and 
Enforcement Problem4.  Another important feature of credit market is that formal lenders are 
not concerned about end- use of loans. The incidences of post borrowing moral hazard5 are 
often found in rural Indian credit market. For example, a person who has applied for a loan for 
use in agricultural production may use it for consumption purpose like meeting expenses of a 
wedding ceremony or religious festival. In such cases the lenders do not have enough 
mechanisms to recover the loan6.  
It is identified in the credit market that there is a large covariance between access to loan and 
income level of a household (Dasgupta 1993).  The asset less and risk averse poor borrowers do 
not get credit in time of distress as supply of credit is generally reducing with the rise in demand 
                                               
1
 See Census 2001. 
2
 In the absence of information about the   returns   from projects of different borrowers, the cost of determining 
the extent of risk of default for each borrower is high. 
3
 It is costly to ensure that borrowers take actions which make repayment most likely. 
4
 In the event of failure of a project, it is difficult to compel repayment. 
5
 Moral Hazard is called a hidden action problem. It is not easily discerned how borrowers are using their loans 
due to information asymmetry.  
6
 The amount of loan is small. If the lenders try to recover the loans through legal procedure, it will be costly for 
them.  
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for credit. To maintain the equilibrium in this market either rate of interest has to be increased or 
high collateral is required (Dasgupta 1993). It is indeed ironical that though the rich have lesser 
need of credit than the poor, they have more access to the credit than the poor.  Because of these 
factors, the informal moneylenders have come to dominate the rural credit market for a long 
time. The moneylenders also charge usurious rate of interest on loans. Another reason for 
dominance of informal money lenders is the prevalence of inter-linked credit transaction. For 
example, a trader prefers to lend to those borrowers who can supply him inputs, say grains. The 
informal lender does not ask for high collateral and as a result, the poor find these informal loan 
facilities easily accessible. 
The government of India has made several attempts to provide credit facilities to the poor since 
the nationalisation of 14 major Commercial Banks in 1969. In the year 1975 Regional Rural 
Banks were set up with the objective of priority sector lending which targeted rural poor and 
weaker section of the society. Through these initiatives, the government was able to make credit 
accessible to 61 percent of rural poor in 1981 whereas only five percent of them were served in 
1951 (Karmakar 1999).   Different programmes were also designed to reach the poor clientele. 
However, experience over the years shows that most of the government implemented credit 
programmes have not been successful and as a result, poor are not able to avail formal credit 
especially during the time of their distress when they are in dire need of credit support.  
Micro-credit emerged as a poverty alleviation tool which has brought hope and light in the lives 
of poor. The initiation of the Micro-Credit movement can be traced to Bangladesh in 70s.  Md. 
Yunus, Noble laureate, Chairperson of Bangladesh Grameen Bank is credited as the pioneer of 
this movement.  The movement over the years has proved that poor are bankable. The success of 
this movement solely depended on Joint Liability Lending7 and Peer Monitoring8.   The model of 
Bangladesh Grammen Bank was also replicated in different parts of the globe. Other important 
microfinance institutions across the world are BancoSol of Bolivia, the Bank of Rakyat of 
Indonesia, the Bank Kredit Deas of Indonesia and the village banks started by the Foundation 
for International Community Assistance (FINCA) in Indonesia etc. Like other developing 
nations, in India this movement started in late seventies. In the initial stage Non Government 
Organisations (NGOs) took the initiative of providing micro-credit service to the rural poor. 
Eventually, National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) came to play a 
prominent role in providing microfinance to the poor in India. 
                                               
7
 Joint Liability Lending promotes screening, monitoring, verification and enforcement of repayment.  
8
 Peer monitoring transfers risk of fund from the lender to the co-signer or peer. 
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II. Microfinance in India 
Microfinance9 has been perceived as an alternative tool of providing financial services to poor 
clientele in India. SEWA (Self Employed Women Association) Bank10 is the oldest microfinance 
organisation in the country. The Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and Non 
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) initiated the microfinance movement and the formal 
financial Sector   joined in at a later stage.  The popular mode of delivering microfinance in India 
is Self Help Groups (SHGs) 11 . Initially, NGO-MFIs motivated poor to form SHGs and 
supported them to manage their savings and internal lending activities within the SHG.  In the 
year 1992, NABARD initiated a pilot project on SHG-Bank Linkage programme in India. For 
this pilot project, Southern States in India were chosen. NABARD took up this programme on a 
full-fledged manner in 1998 after experiencing an immense success of the pilot project. Now 
SHG-Bank Linkage Programme is the largest microfinance programme in the world. Within a 
span of 15 years, the outreach of this programme had increased to 2.24 million credit linked 
SHGs in the year 2006 from 255 credit linked SHGs in the year 1992.  In the present Indian 
microfinance sector, Commercial Banks, Regional Rural Banks, Cooperative Banks, Non Banking 
Financial Companies (NBFCs) and NGOs are involved in offering microfinance services to the 
poor. 
Microfinance movement in India can be divided into two phases. In the first phase of this 
movement, it was found that NGOs and CBOs took the initiative of group formation. They 
nurtured these SHGs and provided micro-credit. In this phase most of the programmes were 
sponsored by national and international donor agencies. In the second phase, Micro-Credit 
movement transformed to a broader level of intervention and came to be recognised as 
Microfinance movement. Formal financial Institutions have joined this movement along with 
NGOs and CBOs. Apart from credit, the provision of other financial products like insurance and 
micro savings is also carried out. It is important to note that that in the nascent stage it the 
movement was considered as a poverty lending exercise and now in the present stage it has 
transformed into a profit earning financial business. Initially the major concern was the 
                                               
9
 Microfinance has come to be referred to as small-scale financial services (including savings, credit, insurance, 
business services and technical assistance) provided to people who work in agriculture, fishing, herding; who 
operate small or micro-enterprises, who provide services; who work for wages or commission; and other 
individuals and groups working at local levels. 
10
 It was set up in 1973 in Ahmedabad, Gujarat. This is a trade union which started organising self employed 
women in this State. 
11
 An SHG is defined as a small informal association of members who have come together voluntarily with the 
objective of obtaining socio-economic benefits on the basis of self help and collective responsibility. 
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horizontal 12  increase of outreach. However, the horizontal as well as vertical 13  increase of 
outreach is the major concern in the second stage.  
Salient Features of Microfinance Sector in India 
Some noticeable features of the microfinance sector in India are discussed here. The most 
debated topic with respect to the development of this sector is its legal framework. No unique 
legal structure of microfinance institutions exists in India. Generally, microfinance services are 
provided by three types of institutions:- Formal Financial Institutions ( such as Commercial 
Banks, Regional Rural Banks, Cooperative Banks and Non Banking Financial Intermediaries 
coming under the ambit of the Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI’s) regulatory  framework flowing 
from the statutory provisions of either the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 or the Reserve Bank of 
India Act, 1934, or both.); Semi Formal Institutions (such as NGOs, NBFCs registered under the 
Registration of Societies Act or Section 25 of the Companies Act or the Cooperative Societies 
Act etc as the case may be ) and Informal Institutions (Self Help Groups and village 
moneylenders etc). According to legal status, semi formal MFIs are not allowed to raise equity 
and mobilise public deposits. As a result most of the semi formal institutions are changing their 
legal status from either a society or a trust to a NBFC or a Bank. In this process they are being 
forced to change their mission of social service to the objective of profit earning. It is also seen 
that the growth of this sector is enormous and resulting in competition among service providers. 
Spread and Outreach of Microfinance Sector 
The other issue is of spread. There is a regional imbalance of outreach in the microfinance sector. 
Majority of the outreach has happened in Southern States like Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and 
Tamil Nadu and other States joined much later. The Table 1 shows the region wise distribution 
of outreach and loan disbursement of the SHG- Bank linkage programme (see Annexure). It can 
be seen that in Southern States about 55 percent of SHGs are linked to the banks and 75 percent 
of total loans are distributed to these SHGs in the States in the year 2006. A very small growth of 
SHG outreach and loan disbursement is found in North-Eastern Region. This region accounts 
for 2.7 percent of total SHGs and 1.5 percent of total loan disbursed. The reason for this 
imbalance could be due to initial selection of Southern States for the pilot project and the 
enormous success of this project in these States. Further, historically these States had a large 
                                               
12
 Horizontal increase of outreach means the increase in number of beneficiaries linked to the formal financial 
sector. 
13
 Vertical increase means improve of the financial services provided to the same beneficiaries. 
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number of nidhis14 and chit funds that have fairly long and successful tenure in many parts of 
these States. These developments are likely to have induced many NGOs and other MFIs to 
launch and implement their micro finance programmes in this region.  
Presently, a large number of NGOs and most of the Banks in India are implementing 
microfinance programmes. It is notable that some branches of Regional Rural Bank and 
Cooperative Bank have regained their profitability through implementing the microfinance 
programme15.  Reserve Bank of India has also given importance to this SHG-Bank Linkage 
programme under the aegis of NABARD. Lending under SHG Bank Linkage by Commercial 
Banks and Regional Rural Banks is considered under priority sector lending.   Some private 
commercial banks like ICICI Pvt. Ltd. and few foreign banks are also implementing this Linkage 
programme.    
Initially there was no geographical overlapping of outreach as microfinance institutions were 
operating in different areas. However, now with the increase in demand for microfinance and 
increase in outreach per institution, in some parts of India, about five to six MFIs are presently 
operating in same geographical areas. Thus, it is observed that rural credit market in some 
pockets is completely saturated. Some MFIs in these pockets are also expanding their services in 
other geographical region with a view to increase their outreach. However, it has resulted 
geographical overlapping of outreach as some other MFIs have already started their operation in 
this new region.  
The Problem  
Despite the geographical overlapping, no MFI is sharing information about the quality of its 
clients with other MFIs in this area. They are facing the imperfect competition in this sector.  
Initially MFIs achieved the high rate of repayment due to joint liability lending. It is identified 
that the joint liability lending is successful when source of credit is limited. However, in the 
present situation with persistence of information asymmetry in microfinance sector has resulted 
in micro-credit clients accessing credit from more than one source. This phenomenon is known 
as ‘double dipping’. If they invest multiple loans and earn significant income, they would be able 
to repay all the debts and improve their living standard. It is found that a large number of 
                                               
14
 Nidhis are  companies formed with the exclusive object of cultivating the habit of thrift, savings  and 
functioning for the mutual benefit of members by receiving deposits only from individuals enrolled as members 
and by lending only to individuals, also enrolled as members. 
15
 Informal discussion with some bankers of Regional Rural Banks and Cooperative Banks in Gujarat and Tamil 
Nadu revealed this fact. 
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microfinance clients have borrowed credit for productive activities 16 . However, they have 
experienced with lack of marketing facilities for selling their products. Along with this the general 
lack of business opportunities in the market, double dipping increases the indebtedness of 
borrowers. It is also found that SHG members have delayed their repayment in presence of 
competition in India as they have not been able to use up credit productively. 
In this present scenario, the paper makes an attempt to study the impact of rising competition of 
MFIs on their clients in India. Section III reviews the existing literature on the impact of rising 
competition in the microfinance sector. Section IV discusses the data and methodology. Section 
V describes the socio-economic profile of the surveyed sample.  Section VI analyses the 
determinants of ‘delay in repayment’ in presence of competition and section VII has the 
conclusions.  
 
III. Microfinance and Competition 
The rapid growth of microfinance movement by socially committed non profit institutions has 
proved that poor are bankable.  Realising this fact, profit maximising formal lending institutions 
have started to penetrate into this market. Now it is the global scenario that non profit 
organisations are facing competition from profit driven lenders. This has made the socially 
motivated non profit lenders re-think about their strategies of reaching the poor. Competition in 
microfinance sector started in the last decade in some countries such as Bolivia, Nicaragua, 
Bangladesh and Uganda (Rhyne and Otero 2006). In other developing countries such as India, it 
has just started. Economic Theory says that competition brings more choices to the consumers 
and it forces the service providers to re-think about their quality of product and strategy.   
The competition in any market has positive as well as negative impacts. The major findings on 
this issue with reference to microfinance sector in the existing literatures are discussed in this 
section. McIntosh and Wydick (2005) have identified three adverse effects of the entrance of new 
MFIs into the same area: - i) Bertrand competition among MFIs reduces the ability of rent 
generation for providing credit to the poorest and potentially least profitable borrowers; ii) 
emergence of a competitive market  restricts grant funding to the poorest potential borrower as 
client maximising non profit lenders are undercut by profit maximising lenders to capture the 
                                               
16It is seen in Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, West Bengal and Tamil Nadu during the field trip organised by IRMA, 
JDS and IFMR. 
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most profitable borrowers in a given pool and iii) competition generates the likelihood of 
increasing asymmetric information between lenders. The more are the number of lenders in the 
market; the information sharing among lenders becomes more difficult. This creates an incentive 
to some borrowers to borrow from multiple lenders (double dipping).  The more is the number 
of lenders entering into the competition; the more is the deterioration in repayment performance 
and in savings deposits of borrowers17.  With absence of the formal mechanism of information 
sharing, MFIs are not able to overcome the problem of double dipping as they do not know the 
indebtedness of their clients.   
Two opposing effects of increase in competition among microfinance lenders in Bolivia have 
been studied in Vogelgesang (2003). On one hand, high competition and increase in supply of 
credit increase the indebtedness of the borrowers resulting in repayment problem. While on the 
other hand, clients with a given level of indebtedness repay punctually as they could be more 
aware of the importance of need of timely repayment as micro-loans are required for conduct of 
their daily business. The author has suggested that lenders could have developed higher 
repayment incentives and efficient screening to compensate for high competition and supply. In 
three conditions, rising competition could have positive impact on the society. These are:-i) a well 
functioning credit information system (helps lenders to know when multiple loans reduce a 
client’s repayment capacity and to manage early). The larger the supply of loans is, the more 
important is the credit information system; ii) a mature market with clear regulations (contributes 
to stability and reduces uncertainty) and iii) the lender’s growth strategies (need to be adjusted to 
increasingly saturated markets). They should concentrate on different directions for growth like 
to rural areas, to larger enterprises or to offer other financial services etc.  
Navajas et al (2003) have analysed the impact of competition between Bancosol, the pioneer 
microfinance bank in Bolivia and Caja Los Andes, Non-banking financial intermediaries (which 
entered into the market at a later stage). Their study reveals that the impact of competition on 
poorest is ambiguous.  Profitable micro-lending would be possible if appropriate lending strategy 
is adopted. They have examined that competition has changed the loan contracts through which 
different segments of market could be served and different classes of poor could access the credit 
facility. They have also found that competition can reduce the outreach of the pioneer-lenders by 
limiting the extent to which the socially motivated lenders cross-subsidise poor borrowers.  
                                               
17
 Poor people have the limited financial resources hence they are not able to save much. In presence of multiple 
MFIs they distribute their savings among these MFIs to access the credit from them. As a result the average size 
of savings per beneficiary per MFI is quite low. 
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How competition has made microfinance institutions efficient is discussed in Rhyne and Otero 
(2006). They have mentioned that Bancosol in Bolivia has increased its productivity, reduced 
costs and increased loan terms to bring its operating expense ratio from the high teens in the late 
1990s to the single digit at present. According to the authors, a final effect of competition is 
greater bargaining power of the clients. They can ask for products and services according to their 
needs. For example, Bancosol has diversified its product under competition.  
Some of the economists have felt the necessity of credit bureaus in microfinance sector. Tedeschi 
(2006) has suggested that there is a burgeoning interest in credit bureaus among MFIs as the 
likelihood of competition in microfinance sector is increasing. Information sharing is one of the 
best practices of microfinance (Campion and Velenzuela, 2001). Isern (2002) has opined that 
credit bureaus should be created specially for microfinance in every part of the world.   
As the formal financial institutions and other financial intermediaries joined the microfinance 
movement in the second phase, the donor agencies adopted the strategy of reducing funds for 
microfinance activities. Cutting interest subsidies to socially motivated microfinance institutions 
(which have already delivered services to the least profitable borrowers in the most economic 
shock prone areas), is not a good strategy to cope with the competition (Tedeschi, 2006). It 
forces some of the MFIs out of business. In Ireland Irish Loan Funds became insignificant in 
presence of their competition with Joint-Stock Banks. It was not because of their inefficiency but 
the market where they used to operate was transitory and they were not acclimatized to diversify 
their portfolio. Moreover, these organisations did not have strong supervisory structure like 
banks (Hollis and Sweetman, 2001).  
In this context this paper has attempted to study the socio economic phenomena which could 
explain why microfinance clients delayed their repayment in presence of competition. In the next 
section data and methodology of the study are discussed.  
 
IV. Data and Methodology 
The data used for this analysis was collected from the survey conducted in 1999-2000 in West 
Bengal 18 . Jeevika Development Society, an NGO is implementing SHG-Bank Linkage 
Programme in South 24 Parganas District since 1994.  JDS formed 142 Self-Help Groups in 4 
                                               
18
 West Bengal belongs to the Eastern part of India. 
Impact of Competition on Microfinance Beneficiaries: Evidence from India 
 
Please note that you are bound by our conditions of use http://www.lse.ac.uk/resources/copyright.htm © LSE 2006. 
Page 9 
blocks of South 24 Parganas in 1999-2000. This survey was conducted on 1074 members of 111 
SHGs spread over 22 villages.  The data set is discussed in more detail in Guha and Gupta 
(2005).  
In surveyed villages, Sagar Grameen Bank (RRB), State Bank of India (Commercial Bank), NGO-
MFIs and Informal moneylenders were providing financial services.  In our dataset it was found 
that repayment rate of members of JDS was around 73 percent (Guha and Gupta, 2005). It was 
also observed that in presence of rising competition among MF lenders some of the SHG 
beneficiaries borrowed from multiple lenders. During the survey, members who did not repay on 
time were asked how many months they had not repaid their loan instalment and interest.  It was 
also asked about their outstanding loans with other sources of credit apart from JDS.   
For field level survey, a suitable questionnaire was designed to cover three aspects of the SHG 
members: 
1) Socio-economic profile of SHG members; 
2) Borrowing profile of SHG members (outside the groups) and  
3) Profile of group savings and lending activities. 
However, in this paper our main focus is on 2nd and 3rd aspects of SHG members. The data were 
collected through field level interviews of SHG members and were processed and analysed. The 
variables are statistically described in the next section and the parameters attached to variables 
explaining reasons for delayed repayment are estimated econometrically.  
 
V. Socio-Economic Profile of SHG members 
In this study we discuss three profiles of SHG members: 
i) Age and occupation wise distribution of family members of all SHG members; 
ii) Profile of household Income and Wealth of SHG members and  
iii) Profile of Borrowing of SHG members inside and outside the groups.  
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It was found that the share of children and adults in the members’ family was higher than that of 
aged population (see table II in Annexure). Life expectancy rate at birth in this area might be 
lower than the State average. It was also found that average number of income earners was less 
than the average number of adults and school goers. It was one of the reasons for joining SHG 
as the household income of SHG members was not adequate to meet their daily expenditure. 
Most of the microfinance institutions in India have claimed that they have targeted the poorest of 
the poor.  It was seen that the average value of cultivated land was Rs. 72801.23 and the average 
value of residential land was Rs. 2,03,948 (see table II).  Further it was found that only 3.8 
percent members did not have residential land and around 54.5 percent members did not have 
cultivated land. So it is difficult to comment that the NGO under the study has been successful 
in targeting the poorest of the poor.  During the survey it was found that around 55.7 percent 
members had outstanding loans with SHGs and average size of outstanding loan was about Rs. 
884.92. In every SHG there was a rule that member borrower could apply for next loan after the 
repayment of her first loan. It was observed in the survey that most of the members had availed 
their first loan from the group. In most of the SHGs, the average size of first loan was around 
Rs. 500 per member. It was identified that SHG members required very small amount of credit. 
However, they were not able to meet even this small need for a long time before joining the 
group.   
It was mentioned in the previous section that five MFIs were operating in surveyed area. As a 
result borrowers were able to access credit from more than one source. The members were asked 
about their profile of outstanding loans with other sources apart from SHGs.  It was found that 
around 75 percent members had outstanding loan with one source, 26.8 percent members had 
outstanding loans with two sources and four percent members had outstanding loans with three 
sources other than the SHG.  It was also observed that members borrowed larger loans from 
outside sources rather than their SHGs. It can be concluded here that credit provided by SHG 
was not adequate to meet their entire credit need.   
If a member does not repay the loan instalment and interest within the stipulated time, she would 
be considered as a defaulter (Guha and Gupta 2005). It was noticed that members tried to 
recover the loan instalment and interest when a default was about to occur in the group. 
Sometimes they made some informal arrangements19.  During the survey we posed a question as 
to understand for how many months the defaulting members did not repay the group loans. 
                                               
19
  For an example, peer members repaid on behalf of the defaulter and they collected it from her later. 
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According to rules of the SHG, every borrower member had to repay the group loan in ten equal 
instalments and each of them was charged interest rate of one percent per month on a reducing 
balance. It was found during the survey that on an average a defaulter missed two loan-
instalments and interest payment.  
 
VI. Factors Responsible for Delay in Repayment 
In this section the reasons for ‘delay in repayment’ is analysed. The model I analyses the impact 
of individual specific variables on delay in repayment. In model II, the combined impact of group 
specific variables and individual specific variables on the dependent variable is carried out.  The 
description of variables is as follows: 
Table III: Description of Variables 
Variable Name               Explanation 
Extrtm = Number of months a defaulter did not repay to the respective SHG.  
Nchild = No. of Children in the members’ family. 
Doubledip =1; if a member borrowed from more than one source of credit 
=0; otherwise.  
Finaprob = 1, if a member had financial problem when she joined the group; 
= 0, otherwise. 
Groupage = Length of time for which the group has been in existence. 
Grosize = Size of the group (number of members in a group). 
Peelonre = 1, if member-borrower repaid her peer’s loan which she borrowed to 
repay the SHG-loan; 
= 0, otherwise. 
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Impact of Individual Specific Variables on Delay in Repayment 
The objective of our analysis is to check the following hypotheses: 
i) The number of Children in a member’s family does not have any impact on her delay 
in repayment; 
ii) The multiple loans taken by member does not have impact on her delay in repayment; 
iii) Financial hardship faced by the member at the time of group formation does not 
have impact on her delay in repayment; 
Model I 
The dependent variable is how many months a member-borrower did not repay her instalment 
and interest to the SHG.  For a successful borrower, it is zero. It might be negative if a member-
borrower repaid in advance20. So the dependent variable is a censored variable. Due to this nature 
of the dependent variable,   a Tobit model of ‘delay in repayment of group loans’ (Extrtm) on the 
number of children in the member’s family (Nchild), borrowing from multiple sources by the 
member (Doubledip) and financial hardship faced by the member at the time of formation of the 
group (Finaprob) is employed. The model is as follows: 
u++++=  FinaprobDoubledipNchild   *Extrtm 321 βββα  
Where Extrtm = 0 if Extrtm*≤0 and Extrtm= Extrtm*, if Extrtm*>0 
The theoretical justification of considering these independent variables is as follows: 
Nchild 
During our survey, it was told that there was more number of children than the income earners 
in the family of SHG members. Further, that all members were from the same income class 
(Guha and Gupta 2005). To measure the financial burden in the family of these members, we 
consider number of children in a member’s family as an independent variable. Higher number 
                                               
20
 However, no borrower had repaid before the stipulated time in our sample observations,  
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shows the higher financial needs. It is expected that members, who have higher financial needs, 
have higher chance of default.  
Doubledip 
With the increase of competition among NGO-MFIs, NBFCs and banks, the members have 
more access to the credit market. They can borrow from more than one source at a time and 
invest it in productive activities. However, lack of opportunity of income generation is found in 
rural part of India.  In this context, it is expected that members who have borrowed from 
multiple sources have high chance of default. 
Finaprob 
Guha and Gupta (2005) analyse that one of the important reasons for group formation is 
financial hardship faced by the member. The members who have financial hardship are likely to 
repay group loans on time as they would need this source regularly of credit to overcome their 
financial hardship. They do not have enough assets, which they can offer as collateral against 
individual formal loans. It is expected that finaprob has negative effect on the dependent variable. 
Empirical Results of the Regression Analysis 
The regression equation for estimation is given as: 
Extrtm* = -1.2019 + 0.0659 Nchild + 2.1744 Doubledip – 0.250491 Finaprob 
    (0.1069)     (0.0219)            (0.09189)                    (0.0682)                
  Pseudo R2= 0.5074 (Standard Errors are in the Parentheses).    
The result of regression analysis is shown in table IV. It is observed that delay in repayment is 
significantly influenced by Nchild, Finaprob and Doubledip.  The present analysis supports that 
the member who has large number of children in the family has delayed in repaying SHG loan.  
We would say from this analysis that members who borrow from multiple sources have overdue 
loans for a long time21.  
                                               
21 From the field it was found that there was a lack of income generation activities and marketing facilities. Because 
of this fact, either member-borrowers were not able to earn positive return from their investment or they were not 
able to invest at all. We might get the above result for this reason. 
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Table IV: Impact of individual specific variables on Delay in Repayment 
Variable  Sign of 
Coefficient 
t-ratio P-value 95% confidence interval 
Constant - -11.24 0.000 -1.4116 -0.9921 
Nchild + +3.00 0.003 0.0229 0.1090 
Doubledip + +23.66 0.000 1.9941 2.3547 
Finaprob _ -3.67 0.000 -0.3843 -0.1167 
Number of observation is 1074; LR χ2(3)=920.03; P > χ2 = 0.0000; Log likelihood = -446.52784. Observation 
summary: 786  left-censored observations at extrtm<=0, 287 uncensored observations and one right-censored 
observation  at extrtm>=5. 
We expect that Finaprob has negative impact on Delay in repayment.  The sign of the parameter 
supports our expectation.  We would say that members who were facing the financial hardship 
tried to avail every opportunity to access the credit during their financial problem. They did not 
want to lose the credit facility provided by SHGs by defaulting on their group loans.  
Impact of Individual Specific and Group Specific Variables on Delay in Repayment 
In this section three group specific variables are introduced as independent variables along with 
the individual specific variables in the model. Our objective is to check whether there is any 
combined impact of these two types of variables on delay in repayment or default. The additional 
hypotheses are:   
i) The age of the group does not have any impact on delay in repayment;  
ii) The size of the group to which the member belongs does not have any impact on 
her delay in repayment; 
iii) The repayment of peer’s loan by the defaulting member does not affect the delay 
in repayment.  
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Model II 
To see the combined impact of individual specific variables such as number of children in the 
family, double dipping, financial hardship and group specific variables like age of the group, size 
of the group and repayment of peer’s loan on delay of repayment, a Tobit model is designed as 
follows: 
uGrosizeGroupage +++++++=  Peelonre  FinaprobDoubledipNchild   *Extrtm 654321 ββββββα
 
Where Extrtm = 0 if Extrtm*≤0 and Extrtm= Extrtm*, if Extrtm*>0 
The justification of considering these group specific variables is discussed below.  
Groupage 
SHGs which exist for a long time are expected to be successful in conducting group savings and 
lending activities. Members of these groups are interested to keep the groups alive. They might 
be efficient at peer monitoring and recovering group loans.  It is expected that groupage has 
negative impact on the dependent variable. 
Grosize 
Besley et al, (1993) and Handa et al, (1999) suggest that the group, which contains large number 
of members, may fail to achieve sustainability. This group might face the monitoring problem. It 
is expected that if the borrower belongs to the SHG with large size, there is a chance of default.  
Peelonre 
During the survey it was found that some groups adopted informal arrangements to reduce the 
chance of default. In this case, defaulter was offered another loan from her peer member for 
repaying group loan for continuing the group activities. For a borrower, it is not possible to repay 
the group loan and peer’s loan simultaneously. It is expected that member would have a chance 
of default if her peers pressurise her for repaying their loans. Peelonre has positive impact on 
delay in repayment. 
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Empirical Results of the Regression Analysis 
The regression equation for estimation is given as: 
Extrtm* = -1.2215 + 0.06944 nchild + 2.0026 doubledip – 0.2002 finaprob – 0.0192 grosize 
      (0.2991)     (0.0223)             (0.0928)                  (0.0693)               (0.0255) 
– 0.0023 groupage + 0.4150 peelonre 
(0.0167)                  (0.0880) 
  Pseudo R2= 0.5205 (Standard Errors are in the Parentheses).    
Table V: Impact of Individual Specific and Group Specific Variables on  
Delay in Repayment 
Variable  Sign of 
Coefficient 
t-ratio P-value 95% confidence interval 
Constant - -4.08  0.000 -1.8086 -0.6345 
Nchild + +3.10 0.002 0.0255 0.1134 
Doubledip + +21.57 0.000 1.8204 2.1847 
Finaprob _ -2.89 0.004 -0.3363 -0.0642 
Groupage _ -0.14 0.888 -0.0351 0.0304 
Grosize _ -0.75 0.452 -0.0692 0.0308 
Peelonre + +4.72 0.000 0.2424 0.5877 
Number of observation is 1074; LR χ2(6)=943.71; P > χ2 = 0.0000; Log likelihood = -434.68539. Observation 
summary: 786 left-censored observations at extrtm<=0, 287 uncensored observations and one right-censored 
observation  at extrtm>=5. 
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Results of testing hypotheses are shown in table V. It is observed that Nchild, Doubledip and 
Finaprob have similar impact on delay in repayment like model I.  With respect to variables 
Groupage and Grosize, we expected that Groupage has negative impact and Grosize has positive 
impact on delay in repayment. However, both coefficients are insignificant and close to zero. 
Peelonre has significant effect on delay in repayment. The sign of the estimated parameter shows 
that it has positive impact on delay in repayment. It is easily discerned that no member is able to 
repay two loans at a time when enough income is not generated from investment. In this state, if 
peers pressurize her to repay their loans which they have given her for repaying the loan 
installment, the member borrower would skip the next installment and interest on SHG loans.  
 
VII. Conclusion and Suggestion  
Microfinance movement in India has entered into its second phase.  Formal, Semi formal and 
Informal microfinance agencies are operating simultaneously. Competition among the 
Microfinance Institutions is very common in India like in Bolivia, Indonesia and Bangladesh etc. 
In presence of competition problem of default increases due to lack of income opportunity. The 
present paper tried to analyse the factors which caused delay in repaying SHG loans.   
Presently microfinance beneficiaries have access to more than one source of credit and other 
financial products such as insurance and savings etc. In absence of adequate income generation 
activities, microfinance borrowers (who have borrowed from multiple sources) are not able to 
repay the loans within the stipulated time. Our analysis shows that members have delayed in 
repaying loans because of double-dipping and the present financial burden because of having 
more children in the family. Their income is not enough to maintain a descent living standard. It 
is very interesting that members who had financial hardship during the group formation are very 
good at repaying the group loans.  This result is due to interconnected reasons. Firstly, since 
these members have been identified and marked as poor by their peers and the financial 
institutions they are not able to access credit from more than one source and hence in such a 
situation these members do not want to loose the opportunity they have acquired of accessing 
credit from their group.  Another noticeable point is that group specific variables do not have 
much impact on the decision of default. As a result group intervention can hardly reduce the 
level of indebtedness of the borrowers.  
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Microfinance has emerged as a poverty alleviation tool. However, in the second phase of its 
development it has raised the indebtedness of a section of beneficiaries.  This could be due to i) 
the growth rate of outreach per institution is quite high and monitoring mechanism is not 
adopted according to the changing scenario; ii) No information sharing mechanism is available 
among the lenders. It has increased the problem of information asymmetry. Every institution 
concentrates on raising their outreach without thinking about the quality of their clientele and iv) 
the growth rate of accessing credit and the growth rate of income generation are not the same. 
Some important factors come to the limelight from the analysis. These are : - i) Microfinance 
Institutions should adopt lending strategy according to the changing scenario of microfinance 
sector for providing better services. For example, MFIs can design loan product in such a 
manner that size of the loan and repayment stipulations be determined in accordance with the 
specific requirements and circumstances of each client rather than being decided mechanically for 
the entire clientele on a uniform pattern. They can offer need-based insurance services to the 
clients; ii) they should maintain the synergy among themselves. They should set up common 
forum or platform for information sharing about the clientele. For example Credit Information 
Bureau of India Limited can allow MFIs to access the information; iii) they should monitor the 
borrowers in the post loan disbursement period. They can monitor how the funds are used up. It 
might help them to reduce the probability of default and iv) they should organise capacity 
building training for their clientele or link up them with some other capacity building programme 
along with their financial services. It could help the borrowers in taking up low-risk and 
profitable projects.  MFIs should make effort in linking credit with marketing facilities. Without 
integration of credit services with marketing initiative, the beneficiaries of microfinance services 
can hardly be expected to graduate themselves to micro entrepreneurs and it would not be 
possible for MFIs to achieve the sustainability and reach the objective of poverty alleviation.       
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Annexure  
Table1: Region wise Cumulative Distribution of Outreach and Loan 
  2005 2006 
Region Cumulative 
Outreach 
Cumulative Loan 
(in million) 
Cumulative 
Outreach  
Cumulative Loan  
(in million) 
Northern 86,018 2395.18 133,097 3985.85 
North-Eastern 34,238 1,019.61 62,517 1,657.01 
Eastern 265,628 5,183.06 394,351 9,354.19 
Central 197,365 5,014.56 267,915 8,050.07 
Western 96,266 2,950.77 166,254 5,251.39 
Southern 938,941 52,421.42 1,214,431 85,676.92 
Total 1,618,456 68,984.60 2,238,565 113,975.43 
 Source: NABARD, 2005 and 2006 
Table II: Descriptive statistics of observed Variables 
Variable  Observation Mean Standard Deviation 
Number of family members 1074 5 1.80 
Number of aged member in the 
family 
1074 0.44 0.66 
Number of Adult in the family  1074 2.3 0.93 
Number of Children in the 
family 
1074 2.4 1.48 
Number of School Goers in the 
family 
1074 1.9 1.42 
Number of Income earners in 
the family 
1074 1.4 0.73 
Value of Cultivated Land  
(in Rs.) 
1074 72801.23 186938.7 
Value of Residential Land  
(in Rs.) 
1074 203948 160443.1 
Outstanding Loan with the 
group (in Rs.) 
587 884.92 707.97 
Outstanding Loan with the 
other lenders (in Rs.): 
1st Loan: 
2nd Loan: 
3rd Loan: 
 
 
804 
288 
43 
 
 
2594.28 
1737.16 
1725.58 
 
 
3736.22 
2224.44 
1752.97 
SHG members who have 
delayed in repaying group loans 
288 1.13 0.40 
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